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Abstract:
We survey research on incurring commitments by voluntary hostage posting as a mecha-
nism of cooperation. The Trust Game is employed as a paradigmatic example of coopera-
tion problems. We sketch a very simple game-theoretic model that shows how voluntary
hostage posting can bind the trustee and thus induce trustfulness of the trustor as well
as trustworthiness of the trustee. We then indicate how the model can be improved by
including uncertainty and incomplete information, transaction costs of hostage posting
and compensating effects as well as signaling effects of hostages. Further extensions
of the theoretical analysis are outlined as well as testable hypotheses and references to
empirical research. Problems for future research are suggested.
1. Why Consider Commitments by Hostage Posting
as a Mechanism of Cooperation?
The study of cooperation by ‘rational egoists’ goes back, at least, to the 17th and
18th century philosophers and social scientists Hobbes and Hume. In fact, Par-
sons (1937, 91) argued that the problem of social order constitutes “the most
fundamental empirical difﬁculty of utilitarian thought”. Quite a bit of Hart-
mut Kliemt’s own research focuses on this problem, including early and original
contributions such as his discussion of Taylor’s (1976) seminal analysis (Kliemt
and Schauenberg 1982) and of course his two impressive monographs (Kliemt
1985; 1986) that provide a comprehensive account both through an overview
and systematic reconstruction of the literature as well as through theoretical
modeling of conditions for cooperation using game-theoretic tools. Arguably, at
least in Germany, Kliemt and Voss (1982; 1985) have been the ﬁrst in social
philosophy and in sociology, who clearly recognized and applied the potential of
game-theoretic tools for tackling Parsons’ challenge.
Kliemt’s early work was on cooperation through repeated encounters be-
tween the same actors (see also Axelrod 1984 who offered an approach that was
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in various respects similar to Taylor’s from almost a decade earlier but was much
more successful in coming up with an easily accessible account of the underlying
mechanisms). An extension are encounters in a network of actors with informa-
tion exchange about others’ behavior (Raub and Weesie 1990). Dyadic embed-
dedness in the sense of repeated encounters and network embeddedness in the
sense of encounters and information exchange with third parties allow for coop-
eration through learning and control (Buskens and Raub 2002; 2010). Learning
is based on past interactions. Actors can learn about their partners from own
previous encounters with those partners or from information about encounters
of third parties with those partners, thus providing opportunities and incentives
for cooperation based on reputation building (e.g., Kreps et al. 1982; Buskens
2003). Control is based on the prospect of future interactions. Given the prospect
that actors meet again, conditional cooperation can become feasible for rational
egoists because others’ cooperation today can be rewarded by own cooperation
in the future, while others’ opportunism today can be punished by withholding
own cooperation in the future.
Dyadic embeddedness and network embeddedness are sometimes, i.e., under
the right set of conditions such as a sufﬁciently high likelihood of future encoun-
ters, but not always sufﬁcient for cooperation among rational egoists. Extreme
cases are one-shot encounters and no exchange of information between actors
as well as situations with a ‘golden opportunity’ for opportunistic behavior in
the sense that opportunism is particularly attractive so that the prospect of fu-
ture sanctions is an insufﬁcient incentive. This raises the problem of specifying
alternative or complementary mechanisms of cooperation.
Commitments by voluntary hostage posting in the sense of pledging a bond
can be a mechanism of cooperation even without repeated encounters and net-
works. The basic idea underlying this mechanism is sharply illustrated with an
extreme but instructive example that is due to Schelling. The example concerns
a cooperation problem between a kidnapper who got ‘cold feet’ and her prisoner.
The kidnapper must trust her prisoner not to turn to the police immediately af-
ter being set free. How to ﬁnd a safeguard that allows the placement of trust?
“Both the kidnapper [...] and the prisoner may search desperately for a way to
commit the latter against informing on his captor [...]. If the victim has com-
mitted an act whose disclosure could lead to blackmail, he may confess it; if not,
he might commit one in the presence of his captor, to create the bond that will
ensure his silence.” (Schelling 1960, 43f.)
Our own paradigmatic example for cooperation by voluntary hostage post-
ing concerns employment relations and the labor market for professionals. The
example seems to have some similarity with typical features of cooperation prob-
lems between universities and their senior faculty, at least in the German aca-
demic system. Employers often have to decide on making investments in an
employee that are largely relationship-speciﬁc (see Becker 1964 on investments
in human capital). For example, the employer provides training and schooling
or she adapts her organization’s internal structure and processes to the em-
ployee’s expertise, supplying him with assistants and additional staff, etc. MuchCommitments by Hostage Posting 209
of these investments have to be depreciated should the employee decide to quit.
If the employer invests, the employee may have to decide between maintain-
ing a durable relationship with the employer or using the new appointment as
a stepping stone and accepting an outside offer. Assuming that the employer
has invested in general human capital of the employee, it seems likely that the
employee will have opportunities and incentives for quitting. After all, through
his increased general human capital the employee becomes more attractive for
other employers who, moreover, do not need to recover the costs of training and
schooling. One way of solving this problem is a contract between the employer
and the employee stipulating that the employee has to pay at least part of the
costs of training and schooling if he quits prematurely. Another way of solving
the problem is non-contractual. The employee moves and acquires real estate
close to his job. Thus, if he quits prematurely and accepts an offer from another
and far away employer, he would have to move again and incur the ﬁnancial as
well as social costs associated with moving.
Hostage posting is a typical example of a ‘strategic move’ through incur-
ring a commitment in Schelling’s (1960) sense. Schelling accentuated the use
of hostages and other commitments in bargaining contexts. He showed that a
committed actor can frequently induce a bargaining outcome that is favorable
for himself and unfavorable for the partner. Thus, counterintuitively, an ac-
tor often has incentives to incur a commitment and to bind himself voluntarily:
“the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind one-
self [...] in bargaining, weakness is often strength, freedom may be freedom to
capitulate, and to burn bridges behind one may sufﬁce to undo an opponent.”
(Schelling 1960, 22) Other than Schelling, though, we consider how and when
commitments such as hostages allow for mutually beneﬁcial adjustments. The
hostage modiﬁes subsequent incentives for cooperation. By posting an appro-
priate hostage in the ﬁrst place, an actor incurs a commitment that serves as a
safeguard for the partner to cooperate (Schelling 1960; Williamson 1985).
Hostage posting becomes feasible under institutional embeddedness of the
trust problem (Weesie and Raub 1996). We assume an institutional context as
given that provides opportunities for actors to post a hostage ex ante, before they
decide on whether or not to cooperate. The context providing the opportunity to
post a hostage is considered as an exogenous condition. By using this oppor-
tunity and posting a hostage, actors create a private institution. As Coleman
(1990) put it, actors create a “constructed social environment” that promotes co-
operation. Thus, institutional embeddedness provides opportunities for private
ordering (Macaulay 1986; Williamson 1985) of relations. The private institu-
tion itself—the hostage—is endogenous. We thus focus on conditions such that
these private institutions result from individually rational equilibrium behav-
ior and are therefore self-enforcing (see Schotter 1981 and Calvert 1995 for the
distinction between institutions as exogenous constraints and as outcomes of
equilibrium behavior). Therefore, we do not assume that an external third party
forces actors to incur a commitment by hostage posting but address the deeper
question concerning the conditions such that a hostage is posted voluntarily210 Werner Raub
and without external coercion (it is noteworthy that Kliemt 1986, 332–349) has
clearly seen the usefulness of commitments for solving cooperation problems as
well as the theoretical challenge to account for how rational egoists can and will
incur commitments). Notice that institutional embeddedness includes but is not
restricted to the legal infrastructure of social relations and the enforcement of
contractual agreements on hostages through the law. Hostages are sometimes
posted through a contractual agreement like the contract stipulating that the
employee compensates the employer for some of the training costs in case of a
premature quit. In other cases, however, hostages are posted informally and the
enforcement of the commitments incurred through hostage posting is not pro-
vided through the law. The employee who moves close to his job posts a hostage
in a non-contractual way.
2. A Very Simple Model for Cooperation by Hostage
Posting
Consider a meanwhile standard example for cooperation problems, namely, trust
problems in the sense that the trustee has incentives to abuse trust and the
trustor has something to lose if trust is abused (Coleman 1990, chapter 5). A
well-known model of trust problems is the standard Trust Game as introduced
by Dasgupta (1988, 59–61) and Kreps (1990, 100–101). The game is played
by two actors. Actor 1 is the trustor and actor 2 is the trustee. The trustor
moves ﬁrst—Coleman stresses the importance of this feature: there is a time
lag between the action of the trustor and the action of the trustee—and chooses
between placing trust and withholding trust. We denote the placement of trust
by C1 (with C indicating ‘cooperation’) and withholding trust by D1 (with D in-
dicating ‘defection’). The game ends if trust is not placed, with payoffs (cardinal
utility) Pi (i Æ1,2) for trustor and trustee. If trust is placed, the trustee chooses
between honoring and abusing trust. If trust is honored, trustor and trustee re-
ceive Ri È Pi. If trust is abused, the trustor receives S1 Ç P1, while the trustee
receives T2 È R2. The trustee thus has an incentive to abuse trust. Note that
these assumptions capture Coleman’s argument that placing trust involves a
risk. The trustor is better off if trust is placed and honored than if she withholds
trust. On the other hand, if the trustee abuses trust, the trustor is worse off
compared to the situation when trust is not placed. The trust problem is there-
fore twofold. First, by placing trust, the trustor incurs risks such as trust being
abused. Second, if the trustor decides not to place trust, both trustor and trustee
could have been better off had trust been placed and honored. In Schelling’s ex-
ample, the kidnapper is in the role of the trustor, while the prisoner is in the role
of the trustee. In our own example, the employer is the trustor and the employee
is the trustee.1
1 In our examples above as well as throughout the paper, ‘she’ refers to the trustor, while ‘he’ refers





























Figure 1: The Trust Game (S1 Ç P1 Ç R1, P2 Ç R2 Ç T2)
Here and subsequently throughout this paper, we use standard game-theoretic
assumptions (see, e.g., Rasmusen 2007) and assume that both actors know the
structure of the game, know that the other actor knows the structure of the
game, and so forth. We furthermore assume that the game is played noncooper-
atively: actors are unable to make enforceable agreements or enforceable one-
sided commitments except agreements and commitments explicitly modeled as
moves in the structure of the game. Obviously, we assume a noncooperative
game precisely because we wish to specify conditions such that rational actors
will be prepared to make these agreements and commitments and to specify con-
ditions such that these agreements and commitments will actually induce trust-
fulness as well as trustworthiness. Thus, we employ the Nash program (Nash
1951) of explicitly modeling bargaining, communication, and all other kinds of
pre-play behavior as moves in an extended noncooperative game, and to derive
cooperative behavior as an equilibrium of that extended game.
The Trust Game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium such that the
trustor withholds trust while the trustee would abuse trust (indicated by the
double lines in Figure 1). This equilibrium is Pareto-suboptimal since both ac-
tors are better of when trust is placed and honored and, hence, the Trust Game
models cooperation problems. In fact, the Trust Game can be seen as a one-
sided version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma: one and only one actor, the trustee, has
opportunities and incentives for opportunistic behavior.
To specify conditions for posting a hostage and for generating and stabilizing
trust by hostage posting, we introduce a Hostage Game which is an extended
version of the Trust Game. In the Hostage Game, the trustee moves ﬁrst and
chooses between posting or not posting a hostage. Subsequently, the trustor is
informed on the trustee’s initial move and the actors play the Trust Game. Note
that the trustor can thus condition the placement of trust on the hostage posting212 Werner Raub
decision of the trustee. Assume that the trustee loses his hostage if and only if he
posts it at the beginning of the game, if the trustor places trust, and if the trustee
subsequently abuses trust. The hostage has value K2 È0 for the trustee and we
assume that the trustee’s utility at the end of the Hostage Game is additive
in his payoff at the end of the corresponding Trust Game and the value of a
possibly lost hostage. For simplicity, we also assume for the time being that
hostage posting is not associated with transaction costs for the trustee and that
a hostage that is lost by the trustee is not given to the trustor (or, equivalently,
the hostage has no value for the trustor).
One easily veriﬁes (Weesie and Raub 1996, 218) that the Hostage Game has
a subgame perfect equilibrium such that the trustee posts a hostage, the trustor
places trust, and the trustee honors trust if K2 È T2 ¡R2. This conﬁrms the
intuition that it can be individually rational for the trustee to voluntarily post
a hostage and that the hostage can be a sufﬁcient safeguard for the trustor to
place trust. This is the case if the hostage is sufﬁciently valuable for the trustee
so that he has incentives to honor trust if trust is placed after hostage posting.
The critical value that makes the hostage binding are the trustee’s costs T2¡R2
of honoring trust in the Trust Game.
Note that the equilibrium strategies that induce hostage posting, placement
of trust, and honoring trust are in one respect similar to conditional cooperation
in repeated encounters. Namely, the equilibrium strategies are ‘reactive’ in the
sense that both actors condition own behavior on the behavior of the partner.
The equilibrium strategy of the trustor makes placement of trust dependent on
prior hostage posting of the trustee. Her equilibrium strategy comprises the
tacit promise to place trust after hostage posting and the tacit threat to with-
hold trust if the trustee does not post trust. Conversely, the trustee’s equilib-
rium strategy comprises the tacit promise not to abuse the trustor’s trust. Sub-
game perfectness of the equilibrium makes for credibility of these threats and
promises.
3. Improving the Model
The simple Hostage Game, while instructive, also suffers from various weak-
nesses of which we mention ﬁve. First, transaction costs of hostage posting have
been assumed away. In our labor market example, though, acquiring real es-
tate close to the new job and moving comes with considerable transaction costs
for the employee: ﬁnancial costs for a real estate agent and a conveyancer, ren-
ovation and redecoration costs, moving costs, but also social costs from losing
relations of the employee, his partner, and children that are tied to his former
place of residence. Also, the employee incurs costs by undermining his bargain-
ing position should a new outside offer emerge.
Second, we have assumed that the trustee’s hostage has no value for the
trustor. However, hostage posting by the employee through a contract stipu-
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schooling if he quits prematurely clearly involves not only a binding effect for
the employee that makes accepting a new job less attractive. Such a contract
likewise involves a compensating effect for the trustor that reduces her damage
in case of opportunistic behavior of the trustee (Williamson 1985, 172 likewise
highlighted the distinction between the value of the hostage for the actor who
posts the hostage and the value of the hostage for the other party).
Third, our model neglects incomplete information problems. Not all employ-
ees have or can expect an outside offer. Typically, there will be asymmetric infor-
mation between the employer and the employee in the sense that the employee
knows whether or not he has or can expect such an offer while the employer
at best can derive the probability for opportunities and incentives for a prema-
ture quit from observable characteristics of the labor market as well as from
observable characteristics of the employee himself. Under such circumstances,
the hostage may serve as a signal for the trustor about unobservable charac-
teristics of the trustee that are related to his opportunities and incentives for
abusing trust. The move of the employee close to his job may then signal that he
does not have and does not expect an outside offer (our distinction between re-
ducing the incentives of the trustee for abusing trust through the binding effect
of hostage posting and using hostages as signals for unobservable characteris-
tics of the trustee is similar to the discussion of ‘ex post’ bonding and ‘ex ante’
screening effects of hostages in Williamson 1985, 168).
Fourth, our model also neglects problems due to uncertainty. For example,
the employer’s investments in her relation with the new employee may be lost
not because the employee quits opportunistically but because the employee falls
ill.
Finally, our model includes not only problematic assumptions but also has at
least one implication that seems highly problematic. Namely, the model implies
that the trustee would be willing to post a hostage even if such a hostage is ex-
tremely valuable for him. This, however, seems intuitively less than plausible
and empirically the value of hostages seems to be typically limited. For exam-
ple, while contracts are not uncommon that stipulate that an employee has to
provide compensation for training costs in the case of a premature quit, the com-
pensation covers only some of those costs and is in any case not excessively high.
Fortunately, remedying these weaknesses simultaneously is feasible. Raub
(2004) provides an extended model of trust by hostage posting with the following
features:
• Uncertainty is included in the underlying Trust Game in the sense that
‘things may go wrong’ (e.g., the employee falls ill) due to unfavorable external
contingencies. The possibility that things can go wrong is accounted for by
assuming a chance event (a ‘move of Nature’) after trust has been placed and
honored.
• Incomplete information of the trustor about the trustee is modeled by as-
suming that the trustee has opportunities and incentives for abusing trust
not with certainty but only with some positive probability. The trustor only214 Werner Raub
knows the probability such that the trustee has opportunities and incentives
to abuse trust but does not know the actual behavioral alternatives and in-
centives of the trustee. The trustor can meet two possible ‘types’ of trustees.
The ﬁrst type is ‘unreliable’ in the sense that he has opportunities and in-
centives to abuse trust. If the trustor places trust, such a trustee can either
honor (C2) or abuse trust (D2). A second type of trustee is ‘reliable’ in the
sense that he has no opportunities for abusing trust. If the trustor meets
such a trustee, the trustee ‘automatically’ honors trust and the game ends
after trust has been placed. A chance move of Nature at the beginning of the
game determines the type of trustee playing the game. The outcome of Na-
ture’s initial move and hence the trustee’s actual type is known to the trustee
himself but is unobservable for the trustor. Such a Trust Game with incom-
plete information provides room for possible signaling effects of hostage post-
ing.2
• In the extended model, the Trust Game with incomplete information is again
embedded in a Hostage Game: Nature moves ﬁrst and determines the trus-
tee’s type. Nature’s move is observed by the trustee but the trustor cannot
observe the trustee’s type and is only informed on the probabilities for ei-
ther type of trustee. Subsequently, the trustee moves and chooses between
posting or not posting a hostage. The trustor is informed on the trustee’s
hostage posting decision. Afterwards, the trustor decides to place (C1) or to
withhold trust (D1). The game ends after D1. If the trustee happens to be of
the reliable type who cannot abuse trust, the game also ends after C1 (more
precisely, the game ends after the reliable trustee’s ‘trivial’ move C2 and the
subsequent chance move of Nature that determines whether or not ‘things go
wrong’ although the trustee honors trust). If the trustor places trust and the
trustee is unreliable, the trustee chooses between honoring (C2) and abusing
trust (D2) and the game ends (again, if trust is honored, after the chance
move of Nature that determines if ‘things go wrong’).
• In the extended model it is assumed that the trustee loses his hostage if and
only if he posts it, the trustor places trust, and the trustee either abuses trust
or honors trust but unfavorable contingencies obtain and ‘things go wrong’
even though the trustee abstains from opportunistic behavior. Hostage post-
ing is thus considered as a mechanism to mitigate risks from opportunistic
2 Alternative assumptions are conceivable. For example, one could imagine that a reliable trustee
has opportunities to abuse trust but has no incentives to do so. This would be the case if the
trustee has internalized norms and values inducing sufﬁcient ‘internal sanctions’ should he abuse
trust and behave opportunistically. Then, honoring trust would be associated with a higher ‘net
utility’ than abusing trust (see Camerer and Weigelt 1988; Dasgupta 1988; Bacharach and Gam-
betta 2001; and Güth and Ockenfels 2003 for such models of trust games with incomplete informa-
tion). Such an alternative scenario leads to similar results like the one considered here. We prefer
our conceptualization because it seems to ﬁt better with a rational choice approach by focusing
on the possible lack of opportunities to abuse trust rather than the possibility that the trustee is
‘(over)socialized’: we keep our assumptions on individuals and their preferences as simple as pos-
sible while complexity is introduced into the model via assumptions on their interaction situation
such as assumptions on feasible actions and restrictions (see, e.g., Wippler and Lindenberg 1987;
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behavior of the trustee as well as risks from uncertainty. For simplicity, we
assume that the value of the hostage for the reliable trustee is the same as
the value for the unreliable trustee.
• Hostage posting is associated with transaction costs for the trustee in the
extended model. We consider transaction costs in Williamson’s (1985, 20–22,
388) sense, that is, costs of drafting, negotiating, setting up, and running the
hostage arrangement. Examples are opportunity costs due to the temporary
impossibility of using the hostage, enforcement costs through hiring a lawyer
who monitors the hostage arrangement, the risk that a hostage posted under
the control of the partner is unexpectedly not returned later on, and costs
that results from reduced ﬂexibility to respond to changes in exogenous con-
ditions. These costs arise if and only if the trustee decides to post the hostage
and do not depend on how the game develops after hostage posting. Hence,
these costs are not only due if the trustee loses his hostage (in this case, one
could consider the transaction costs simply as an ingredient of the value K2
of the hostage for the trustee) but also if trust is placed and honored after
hostage posting as well as if no trust is placed after hostage posting.
• A core assumption of the extended model is that the transaction costs of
hostage posting can differ between the two types of trustees. On the one
hand, allowing for differences in transaction costs seems realistic. In the ex-
ample of the employee who posts a hostage by moving close to his job, an
important ingredient of the transaction costs involved in posting the hostage
is due to undermining the employee’s bargaining position vis-à-vis an alter-
native employer offering a new position. These transaction costs emerge by
deﬁnition for an employee who is unreliable in the sense of our model, while
a reliable trustee does not have to incur these costs. While the assump-
tion that transaction costs of hostage posting can differ between different
types of trustees seems to be empirically plausible, differences in transac-
tion costs are also interesting from our theoretical perspective on trust based
on hostage posting. After all, one expects from signaling theory (Spence
1974) that the signaling function of hostages depends on differences in sig-
naling costs for different types of trustees. Transaction costs associated with
hostage posting can be conceived as signaling costs of hostage posting and
therefore the question arises if differences in transaction costs for different
types of trustees can affect the signaling function of hostages.
• To account for the compensation function of hostages, the extended model
assumes that a lost hostage is given to the trustor for whom the hostage has
value K1. The case K1 Æ0 can be interpreted as the situation such that a lost
hostage is not given to the trustor (see Weesie and Raub 1996, 214–216, for
a detailed discussion of ‘hostage institutions’, that is, exogenous rules of the
hostage game that determine under what conditions actors lose a hostage
and what happens with a lost hostage). Note that our examples differ with
respect to the value of the hostage for the trustor. The contract stipulating
that the employee has to pay for (some) training costs in case of a prema-216 Werner Raub
ture quit is a relatively valuable hostage for the employer. The value of the
hostage ‘moving close to one’s job’, while being high for the employee who
posts the hostage, is low for the employer.
• In the extended model, each actor’s payoff can be assumed to be additive in
the actor’s payoff at the end of the corresponding Trust Game, in the value
of a hostage lost or received, and in transaction costs of hostage posting (see
Raub 2004, 339, for the extensive form of the game).
The extended model allows for deriving generic conditions such that placing and
honoring trust based on hostage posting becomes individually rational in the
sense of being supported by a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (see Rasmusen 2007
for a discussion of the concept). For appropriate values of the model parameters,
a pooling equilibrium exists, i.e., an equilibrium such that the hostage posting
decision of both types of trustees is the same so that hostage posting does not
signal the type of the trustee (Raub 2004, Theorem 1). For other parameter
values, the model implies the existence of separating equilibria of the extended
model (Raub 2004, Theorem 2). These are equilibria such that the two types
of trustees differ with respect to their hostage posting decision so that hostage
posting involves a signal for the trustor about the type of the trustee. The in-
teresting case from a substantive perspective involves that the reliable trustee
posts a hostage while the unreliable trustee chooses not to post a hostage and
the trustor places trusts after hostage posting but withholds trust if no hostage
has been posted. Here, posting a hostage signals that the trustee is reliable.
In our example, this would be the case such that the employee’s willingness to
move close to his job would indicate that he does not have and does not expect to
receive an outside offer from another employer. Rather than providing techni-
cal details, we summarize the substantive conditions for trust based on hostage
posting that follow from the analysis of the extended model.
The extended model implies, ﬁrst, that the hostage has to be valuable enough
for the trustee if the hostage promotes trust by binding the trustee. Binding is
an issue if the trustee who posts the hostage may be unreliable—the reliable
trustee cannot abuse trust. The theorem on the pooling equilibrium (a hostage
is posted by the unreliable trustee) speciﬁes a lower bound on the value K2
of the hostage for the unreliable trustee and this lower bound depends on the
unreliable trustee’s costs T2¡R2 of honoring trust in the Trust Game.
Second, the hostage has to be valuable enough for the trustor for induc-
ing trust through compensation. The extended model allows to specify a lower
bound on the value K1 of the hostage for the trustor. The lower bound on the
value of compensation depends crucially on the amount of uncertainty that is
associated with placing trust. If the risk of unfavorable contingencies is high,
the hostage must provide positive compensation for the trustor. If the proba-
bility of unfavorable contingencies is small enough, it sufﬁces that the hostage
binds the trustee or signals that the trustee is reliable and it is not required that
the hostage also includes positive compensation of the trustor in case things go
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The third result is that signaling via hostages is related to differences be-
tween different types of trustee in their transaction costs associated with hostage
posting. In the extended model, differences in transaction costs are the only pos-
sible differences between the two types of trustees. The extended model implies
that signaling requires that the transaction costs of hostage posting are lower
for the type of trustee who posts the hostage than for the other type of trustee
who does not post the hostage.
The fourth condition for trust based on hostage posting that follows from the
extended model is that transaction costs associated with hostage posting have
to be small enough. An equilibrium such that a hostage is posted requires upper
bounds on the transaction costs of hostage posting for the (type of) trustee who
posts the hostage. More precisely, the upper bound depends on the gains R2¡P2
from honored trust compared to the situation of withheld trust. Also, the upper
bound on the transaction costs of hostage posting depends on the probability of
unfavorable contingencies after trust has been placed and honored.
Fifth, the extended model implies that the hostage should not be too valu-
able for the trustee in order to allow for trust via hostage posting. The extended
model provides upper bounds on the value K2 of the hostage for a trustee who
posts the hostage. The upper bound depends on the gains R2¡P2 from honored
trust compared to the situation of withheld trust. One can show that an upper
bound on the value of the hostage for the trustee is only required if the underly-
ing trust problem involves uncertainty so that the trustee may lose his hostage
even without opportunistic behavior.
A sixth result concerns properties of the equilibrium strategies that induce
hostage posting as well as placing and honoring trust. Just like in the sim-
ple model from section 2, the equilibrium strategies are ‘reactive’. The strategy
of the trustor makes her placement of trust dependent on prior hostage post-
ing of the trustee. Her strategy carries the tacit promise to place trust after
hostage posting and the tacit threat to withhold trust if the trustee does not
post a hostage. Conversely, if the unreliable trustee posts a hostage in equilib-
rium, his strategy implies a tacit promise not to abuse the trustor’s trust. The
equilibrium ensures that these threats and promises are credible.
Finally, one can show that a pooling or a separating equilibrium inducing
trust by hostage posting is either unique or is at least a weak Pareto-improve-
ment compared to all other—if any—equilibria in the extended model. Thus, if
such equilibria exist, equilibrium selection problems are not severe. The predic-
tion that rational actors will post hostages and will place and honor trust follows
from the uniqueness of the equilibrium or from payoff dominance arguments.
It is helpful to relate these results to our labor market example example of a
trust problem and of hostages as a mechanism to induce trust. A contract stipu-
lating that the employee has to reimburse the employer if he quits prematurely
presumably serves binding purposes and also provides some compensation for
the employer. The hostage ‘moving and acquiring real estate close to the job’
does not provide compensation for the trustor. This hostage seems to serve not
only binding but also signaling purposes. After all, the transaction costs of post-218 Werner Raub
ing the hostage differ severely between employees who have or expect an outside
offer and those who do not have and do not expect such an offer.
As usual, the question arises on whether the results generalize to other coop-
eration problems than ‘only’ trust problems like in our models. E.g., do results
generalize to other 2- and n-person social dilemma games? Do results general-
ize to other ‘hostage institutions’, i.e., rules that specify under what conditions
a hostage is lost, what happens to a lost hostage, and also specify the conditions
under which transaction costs of hostage posting arise and for whom those costs
arise. Weesie and Raub (1996) provide quite some such generalizations, albeit
in complete information contexts.
4. Testable Implications and Policy Recommendations
The extended model implies testable predictions for laboratory experiments. Ob-
viously, such experiments require explicit assumptions on how material incen-
tives provided by the experiment relate to utility functions of subjects. In an
experimental design, the extended model could be implemented by using a ran-
dom device that determines the type of the trustee at the beginning of the exper-
iment in such a way that the trustor knows the relevant probabilities but cannot
observe the outcome produced by the random mechanism. An approach for de-
riving predictions for experiments is to vary some parameter of the extended
model that is interesting from a substantive perspective so that different model
implications on trust via hostage posting apply. To illustrate, consider varying
the probability of unfavorable contingencies. For example, compensation of the
trustor through hostage posting in the sense that the hostage is rather valuable
for the trustor should have a stronger effect on hostage posting as well as on in-
ducing trust by hostage posting if the underlying trust problem involves a high
probability of unfavorable contingencies. Research in this direction seems to be
particularly promising because much experimental evidence on hostages as a
mechanism of cooperation in dilemmas such as the Trust Game and the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (Raub and Keren 1993; Snijders 1996, chapter 6; and Snijders
and Buskens 2001) indicates that—empirically—positive compensation through
hostage posting has a strong effect on trust and cooperation.
A focus on the effects of uncertainty and the probability of unfavorable con-
tingencies seems also useful for empirical applications outside the laboratory.
The prediction would be that hostages tend to provide more compensation for the
trustor if the underlying trust problem is one with a higher probability of unfore-
seen contingencies. Conversely, keeping the probability of unforeseen contingen-
cies constant, one would expect that binding and signaling properties of hostages
are stronger (K2 increases and different types of trustees differ strongly with re-
spect to the transaction costs of hostage posting) in case of increasing risks from
opportunistic behavior. Other testable predictions can be generated by consider-
ing the effects of increasing differences in transaction costs of hostage posting for
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we would expect that increasing differences in transaction costs come with more
variation in hostage posting decisions. Finally, predictions for social situations
outside the laboratory could focus on characteristics of trustees who are willing
to post certain types of hostages. For example, an employee will tend to move
and acquire real estate close to his new job if his transaction costs associated
with posting this hostage are low: the employee will be more likely to move if
he had a rented ﬂat rather than privately owned real estate, if he is single or
has a household with a partner who is not active on the labor market. While
predictions of such characteristics may seem obvious, predictions on the effects
of hostage posting for subsequent behavior of trustor and trustee may be more
interesting. One would expect that the actual period of employment is longer
if the employee moves, that the investments of the employer in the employee
will be higher, and that the employee will produce more output and will be more
inﬂuential within the employer’s ﬁrm.
What about policy recommendations such as recommendations for employ-
ers on how to design the contractual relation with a newly hired professional?
Such policy recommendations should have two properties. First, they should
improve the conditions for a pooling or a separating equilibrium inducing trust
by hostage posting. Thus, they should facilitate hostage posting of employees
by reducing their transaction costs or increasing the value of the hostage ‘mov-
ing’. Second, and simultaneously, these recommendations should be attractive
for employers in the sense of economizing on their costs and not requiring agree-
ments with other potential employers that might be difﬁcult to enforce due to
coordination problems or due to competition between employers for scarce re-
sources on the labor market. Employers often reimburse employees for moving
costs, thus reducing employees’ transaction costs associated with moving. More-
over, employers often reimburse employees for a certain period of time for their
travel expenses between their new workplace and their old residence. The idea
underlying the latter arrangement seems to be to facilitate the transition period
before moving. A typical arrangement seems to be that the reimbursement for
moving costs has to be repaid if the employees quits prematurely (e.g., within a
period of two or three years), while in such a case employees do not have to re-
pay their reimbursement for travel expenses. The recommendation would then
be to increase the value of the hostage ‘moving’ and reduce transaction costs
associated with moving by changing the ‘mix’ of reimbursements for moving
and travel expenses. See to it that reimbursements for travel expenses like-
wise have to be repaid if the employee quits prematurely or take care that these
reimbursements are paid only after the employee has actually moved. Also, in-
crease reimbursements for moving while decreasing the size of reimbursements
for travel expenses or the length of the period for which reimbursements for
travel expenses are available.220 Werner Raub
5. Commitments by Hostage Posting in a Broader
Research Program on Mechanisms of Cooperation
Research on commitments by hostage posting can and should be seen as embed-
ded in a broader research program on mechanisms of cooperation. We brieﬂy
sketch three perspectives on commitments by hostage posting that emerge from
such a broader program.
The ﬁrst perspective is of a more ‘philosophical’ nature. Via hostage posting,
an actor manipulates his own outcomes in situations with strategic interdepen-
dence such as trust problems and other cooperation problems. The analysis
shows that it can be individually rational for selﬁsh actors to post hostages.
Imagine now that an actor is not only able to manipulate his outcomes but also
to directly manipulate preferences over outcomes, with outcomes as such re-
maining the same. As a variation on the same theme, imagine a third party
whose preferences coincide with those of the trustee but who is also able to mod-
ify the trustee’s preferences—a scenario that is somewhat similar to parents as
third party who try to modify their children’s preferences through various social-
ization efforts. It follows directly from the analyses sketched above that rational
and selﬁsh actors being able to choose and modify their own preferences would
be willing to do so in social dilemmas like Trust Games (see Raub and Voss 1990
for a related analysis of endogenous preference changes, while Güth and Kliemt
2000 approach this problem from an evolutionary angle).
Second, note that our analysis centered on the effects of hostage posting for
actors’ outcomes after a game has been played. In this sense, our analysis fo-
cused on hostage posting as a mechanism of cooperation through outcome-based
motivations. However, quite some recent rational choice research on coopera-
tion submits that process-based motivations should be considered, too (e.g., Fehr
and Schmidt 2006; Vieth 2009). For example, a trustee honors trust not because
of the implications of honoring trust for subsequent outcomes but because he
considers the trustor’s placement of trust as kind behavior that he wishes to re-
ciprocate by being kind himself through honoring trust. From this perspective,
posting or not posting a hostage can affect subsequent placement of trust not
only through the effects of hostage posting for outcomes of trustor and trustee
but also because, e.g., the trustor considers hostage posting as kind behavior of
the trustee that she wishes to reciprocate by placing trust, while she considers
the trustee’s decision not to post a hostage that he could have posted as unkind
behavior that she wishes to reciprocate by withholding trust. In a similar vein,
the trustee may be induced to honor trust not only because of a motivation to
reciprocate kind behavior of the trustor but also because of a desire to be con-
sistent with his own prior hostage posting decision. One easily intuits that such
a mechanism may even work with hostages that have small or no consequences
in terms of modifying outcomes, i.e., have small or no binding and compensation
effects (see Vieth 2009 for interesting theoretical as well as experimental work
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As a third perspective, note that an analysis of hostage posting as a mech-
anism of cooperation has been motivated with the observation that repeated
encounters and encounters in a network can be insufﬁcient for stabilizing trust.
The model, however, is a model without these forms of embeddedness rather
than a model such that repeated encounters are too ‘weak’ to stabilize trust. See
Raub (1992) as well as Weesie et al. (1998) for work accounting for the combined
effects of dyadic and network embeddedness and of opportunities for hostage
posting through institutional embeddedness for the solution of trust problems.
6. Problems for Further Research
Quite some questions on commitments by hostage posting remain for further
research. First, consider the “expropriation hazard” (Williamson 1985, 177) and
the loss of ﬂexibility (Becker 1991, 12–13) associated with hostage posting. In
the models sketched here, only the trustee and not the trustor faces opportu-
nities and incentives for abusing trust. However, this need not be true. Con-
sider the case of hostage posting of the employee by moving close to his job.
This hostage is not subject to an expropriation risk since the hostage as such
is not valuable for the employer but posting the hostage reduces the ﬂexibility
of the trustee if contingencies change. Such changing contingencies can depend
on ‘moves of Nature’ rather than on incentive guided behavior of the employer.
An example is the risk that the ﬁrm goes bankrupt due to market ﬂuctuations
rather than bad management of the employer as owner/manager. However,
contingencies may also change due to strategic behavior of the employer after
hostage posting of the employee. For example, when hiring the employee, the
employer may offer not only investments in future training and schooling but
may also promise future general policies that are attractive for the employee.
Such promises are often non-contractual and not legally binding or enforceable.
If the employee commits himself by moving, he loses ﬂexibility to react to the
employer’s future deviations from the promises. Expropriation risks and the
expected costs of loss of ﬂexibility can be included in the transaction costs as-
sociated with hostage posting. This seems satisfactory for risks that depend
on moves of Nature rather than strategic behavior of the partner. A more ap-
propriate analysis that takes strategic behavior of the other actor into account
would require to model hostage posting as a mechanism of cooperation in more
complex dilemma situations with possibilities for opportunistic behavior of more
than one actor. Reciprocal hostage posting by both actors is an obvious mecha-
nism for mitigating risks from two-sided opportunistic behavior (see Williamson
1985, chapter 8, for examples; Weesie and Raub 1996 for formal model build-
ing using games with certainty and complete information; and Raub and Keren
1993 for experimental results).
The expropriation risk and the loss of ﬂexibility are problems associated with
hostage posting. One can also imagine possible further beneﬁts of hostage post-
ing in addition to promoting trust. One such beneﬁt that merits closer analysis222 Werner Raub
is that posting the hostage may make the relation between trustor and trustee
more productive. For example, the employee who moves close to his job may
not only promote investments of the employer in the employee’s training and
schooling. Moving close to his job may moreover in itself imply an additional
contribution to the employee’s productivity and job satisfaction since he beneﬁts
from reduced commuting time, better (opportunities for) contacts and interac-
tion with colleagues etc. It should be easy to show that ‘productivity’ of a hostage
in this sense implies that the conditions for trust based on hostage posting be-
come less restrictive since posting the hostage also increases the payoffs Ri from
trust that is placed and honored. A variant on this theme is that hostage posting
of the trustee is associated with costs for the trustor. For example, an employ-
ment contract stipulating that the employee has to pay for some training and
schooling in case of a premature quit comes with some costs of contracting also
for the employer. This would reduce R1 after a hostage has been posted. In
such a scenario, the conditions for trust based on hostage posting become more
restrictive.
A ﬁnal feature of our example that has not been modeled explicitly is hostage
selection. The employee can post a hostage by moving to his job or by signing
a contract stipulating that he pays back training and schooling costs of the em-
ployer after a quit. When to choose one or the other of these hostages, when
both? It seems reasonable to assume that the transaction costs associated with
posting different hostages as well as the value of the hostage will be important
factors that affect the trustee’s decision but a more thorough analysis seems
useful (see Snijders 2000 for ﬁrst steps in the analysis of the hostage selection
problem).
In a contribution honoring Hartmut Kliemt and his work it would be strange
at least not to mention that the approach presented here throughout assumed
perfect rationality in the sense of game-theoretic equilibrium behavior. Much of
Kliemt’s earlier work (such as 1982 and 1986 on cooperation problems) likewise
employed such assumptions but he has increasingly moved towards bounded
rationality approaches (e.g., Güth and Kliemt 2004). A bounded rationality ap-
proach to commitments by hostage posting is not only far beyond the scope of
the present contribution but is to this author’s best knowledge still lacking in
the literature (e.g., while Williamson often refers to bounded rationality, also in
his work on commitments and hostages, he typically seems to have in mind vari-
ous kinds of information limitations that are quite different from bounded ratio-
nality in the sense of other than equilibrium behavior). One may add, though,
that a core ingredient of the idea of cooperation by hostage posting is that actors
post hostages with an eye on the effects of hostage postage for future behavior of
their partners. Thus, less than perfect rationality may sufﬁce to induce hostage
posting but it seems that the mechanisms is closely tied to at least some forward
looking behavior and anticipation of the effects of own present behavior on the
future behavior of others (or, even though Kliemt does not favor this interpreta-
tion, as if behavior of this kind).Commitments by Hostage Posting 223
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